On the Historical Development of the Concept of Inferential Upādhi

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The Nyāya school, which mainly concerned itself with epistemology and logic, is generally considered to have established its theory of inference through a particular usage of the word “upādhi.” While the importance of understanding this concept has long been recognized among scholars who aim to investigate the Nyāya theory of inference, there has often been a misunderstanding that upādhi has the function of making an invalid inference sound by its addition to, or by its association with, a false inferential mark. Considering this, prior research has pointed out that the word does not actually have any sense of the factors “associate” or “additional” in the context of inference. Dr. Phillips, in his recent research, confirmed that upādhi never works as an inferential corrector that has the power to change false inferential marks into sound ones, and argued that upādhi should be understood as an “undercutter,” which blocks the occurrence of inferential cognition, or, as a device to find pseudo-inference. Thus, he suggested an “undercutting condition” for the English translation, which seems to be widely accepted.

On the basis of the above prior achievement, this presentation aims to clarify the historical change in the concept of upādhi. While investigation has so far focused on Navya-nyāya texts, such as the Tattvacintāmaṇi and the Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, this presentation introduces Prācīna-nyāya texts, such as Vācaspati’s Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā and Udayana’s Parisūddhi, to make clear the early concept of this word and examine inclusively how it has historically changed.

It does seem certain that upādhi was given the role of “undercutter” in the Navya-nyāya system, and hence, the words “additional” or “associate,” which may lead us to misunderstanding, should be avoided in translations of the word “upādhi” at least in the reading of Navya-nyāya texts. However, this is not the case for its early concept. In Vācaspati’s Tātparyaṭīkā, we can find the early concept of upādhi, which was developed through discussion between Naiyāyikas and Buddhist logicians on the ascertainment of causal relationship. At this historical stage, upādhi does seem to have had a meaning of an “associate factor necessary for the occurrence of y’s existence from x” rather than an “undercutting condition for the occurrence of inferential knowledge of y from x.” This investigation will clarify this point, and then proceeds to some other later texts to show indications of when and where Naiyāyikas eventually intended to abandon the “associate” aspect of upādhi.