**Hume’s Principle for Humeans**

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Abstract

It is a hallmark of Humeans that they take their denial of necessary connections as something of normative force. But, the Humean ban on necessary connections is not unrestricted. They believe that things (sets and their members, say) in some cases are necessarily connected. This raises a question for Humeans. What is a principled criterion of things such that those things and only those things are necessarily connected? This question is often ignored by Humeans. But, if the Humean ban is to be of normative force, not merely consistent, then Humeans cannot dismiss the question. What makes the task of answering the question a difficult one is that Humeans are not empiricists but naturalists. In this paper, I offer Humeans an answer to the question which will serve their purposes. After taking a closer look at Hume’s own denial of necessary connections, I separate between Hume’s principle and Hume’s empiricist doctrine. I argue that Hume’s principle can serve as a principle not only for Hume but also for Humeans.