The long-standing dispute whether Plato's discussion of poetry involves a conflict between Books III and X or not, is now apparently calmed down. But this controversy among scholars has been, in fact, a parody of the quarrel between philosophy and poetry, which is nothing new, as Socrates says at 607b. It suggests that such a dispute will never end. Scanning the first part of the Book X alone, we may find another conflict. All poets, from Homer downward, are imitators(600e), so that any sort of poetry is imitation. And poetry should be banned from the best city on the ground that it is imitative. From these premises it can be inferred that any poetry cannot be admitted, nevertheless 'hymns and eulogies' are left as acceptable form of poetry at 607a. Some commentators claim that every poetry is imitative, but some of them are allowed on the ethical criterion. But it seems impossible to separate the ethical element from the Plato's concept of imitation. Further we can raise a more basic question; does Plato really prove that any poetry is a process of imitation, that is image-making? For image-making is visual above all, and is not germane to acoustico-poetical imitation. Socrates let out enigmatic words when he began to inquire what is imitation in general. He confesses his own ignorance, whereas he is confident in his superior power of seeing at the same time. It seems to warn us not to take for granted the following definition of imitation.

In this paper firstly I re-confirm the reason why poet should be banished (605b2-c4, and 603a10-b4), and reject the interpretation that poetry is banned on the ethical standard apart from imitation or image-making, for moral lowness is contained in the concept of the imitativeness. Furthermore, I trace the metaphysical inquiry performed at 595a-602c and try to show that it does not prove that all poetry is imitative, but also this incompleteness is designed on purpose. The tragic poet, 'if he is an imitator' is third from the King and the truth. Socrates next attempts to remove this hypothetical condition by displaying hyperbolically that tragedians including Homer have no knowledge of that whereof they write.

It is commonly assumed that Plato's argument against poetry depends on a series of analogies with painting. But I propose another reading of the metaphysical inquiry of 595A-602C, through paying attention to its peculiar character. The inquiry goes on according to the habitual method among the Socratic circle, so that the argument is too concise and sometimes appears clumsy. The clumsiness, however, is false impression made by the picture that the very philosopher is deliberately dropped from the description of the craftsman and the user. Philosophers are those who seek what is just in itself and regard it in establishing the governance of their own soul. The quarrel between philosophy and poetry is that between the Form of Justice described as the best city by Plato and the Tragic Hero exemplified in Homer's Achilleus.

In Republic VIII and IX, Plato explains how four types of unjust persons --the timocratic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical persons-- come to be. A young person becomes, say, timocratic, when his reason is nourished by his father, while his spirit and appetite by his mother and others, so that he himself "hands over rule" in his soul to spirit (550a-b). This is how Plato elucidates the emergence of unjust persons on both the passive and active sides (cf. 553a-e, 558c-561b). On the passive side, he stresses the cultural influences of a society under which the youth grows up. On the active side, the youth is said to commit himself to this process, which clearly exemplifies "the choice of lives" theme of the Republic. How then does Plato account for the mechanism of the unjust persons' choice of lives?

Terence Irwin [Plato's Ethics, 1995] asked what is the agent that "hands over" rule to one or another part of the soul. Assuming (1) that the choice of life consists in deliberately deciding to follow the longer-term aims of one or another of the non-rational parts, and (2) that this kind of deliberation and decision belongs only to the rational part, Irwin answered that the agent of the choice of life (of "handing over" rule) is the rational part. Although most scholars agree with Irwin, I think that his interpretation is not persuasive in the way it makes light of the passive side of the choice of unjust lives. In this paper I first take up Plato's theory of early education in Books II and III, to shed light on this passive side --the internalization of cultural/social norms (doxai or tupoi). Next, I turn to Books VIII and IX to discuss why Plato is interested in the active side, in spite of the emphasis he places on the passive side. In so doing, I show that Plato characterizes a youth's choice of an unjust life as his entrusting himself to cultural/social norms. Finally, referring to Books IV and IX, I argue that the agent of "handing over" is the whole soul, not one or another part of it, which does not care for itself or how to live. The youth chooses his unjust life in such a way that he entrusts himself to cultural/social norms without deliberating as to whether they are really good for him. This is how Plato directs our attention to the fact that the many bound in the Cave are not aware of their own situation and need to begin to care for the soul, since they themselves are responsible for their unjust and unhappy lives, by choosing their lives.

One of the crucial claims made in the Timaeus appears to be that the body of the universe is indestructible by any agent other than the Demiurge who bound it together (31b8-c4). This claim is striking, for this kind of indestructibility of the universe, which I shall call de facto indestructibility, contradicts the fundamental proposition at Timaeus 31b4 that the universe is bodily, visible and tangible. It should be remembered that in the Platonic corpus 'bodily nature' usually connotes evil, mortality and destructibility; this motif is observed clearly in, for example, the Phaedo and the Politicus myth.

This state of affairs needs to be explained. I shall be claiming in this paper that the notion of de facto indestructibility of the body of the universe is founded in the Timaeus on the achievements and ideas of stereometry. Mathematical entities in themselves, of course, are not subject to coming-to-be and passing-away. By describing the fundamental constitution of the body of the universe in stereometrical terms, Plato facilitates the transition to the claim that the only mode of destruction to which the universe would be liable would be if the Demiurge himself wished to undo his work -- which of course he never would. The key to this transition is the move from somatoeides(31b4) to stereoeide(32b1), and it is this move that will be the chief focus of attention in this paper.

Two steps are to be observed in the argument which connects the fundamental statement that the universe must be bodily, visible and tangible (31b4) with the framework of fire, earth, air and water. The first step consists in linking 'visibility and tangibility' to 'fire and earth', where the term 'stereon' is deliberately introduced at 31b6. The word 'stereon'�@slides into the text initially to signify merely solidity, but carrying overtone of mathematical extension, which it might be said allow Plato to introduce the concept of stereoeide(a three-dimensional mathematical solid).

�@The second step is composed of the introduction of the theory of proportion (analogia) which requires 'air' and 'water' as the middle terms uniting 'fire' and 'earth'. The move from the first step to the second step, which the term 'stereon' plays a crucial role in facilitating, is followed by the striking introduction of the basic rule of proportional equation; the mathematical formulation of proportional equation is used to provide a reason why the Demiurge chooses, in particular, the principle of proportion as the cosmic bond to unite fire, earth, air and water. The theory of proportion is derived from the achievements of stereometry in the fifth century and incorporated in the Timaeus.

The stereometrical ideas relating to the de facto indestructibility of the universe are, the theory of the two mean proportionals, and the method of constructing the regular solids. The theory of the two mean proportionals introduces an original idea concerning the nature of the bond that unites the primary bodies. While in Empedocles the cosmic bond is 'love', what we have in the Timaeus is 'geometrical proportion' (analogia), which is described as the fairest of bonds (desmon kallistos) (Timaeus 31c2). This secures the de facto indestructibility of the universe at one level. Stereometry gives an assurance of eternal bodily existence, which is a necessary attribute in the Greek tradition of mathematical entities bound by dissoluble numerical proportions. The ideas derived from stereometry thus form a crucial part of the metaphysical foundation of the Timaeus.

In this paper, I shall consider what is the meaning of the idea that matter is potentiality and form is actuality by dealing with the problem of the unity of matter and form in Aristotle's Metaphysics H 6. According to the orthodox interpretation of H 6, Aristotle attempts to solve the problem of the unity of the definition signified by genus and differentia. It is true that Aristotle refers to the definition of 'man' as 'two-footed animal', but the reference to H 3 at the beginning of H 6 shows us that he is concerned with the problem of the unity of the definition combining matter and form. In fact, Aristotle tentatively defines 'cloak' as 'round bronze' in order to show the problem of the unity of a definition. So it is the problem of the unity of the definition composed of matter and form that should be solved by the concepts of potentiality and actuality in H 6.

But Aristotle turns to the problem of the unity of matter and form, not of the definition composed of them. For in his view, to give an account of the unity of matter and form is to give an account of the unity of the definition composed of them. In connection with this, how should we understand the unity of the composite of matter and form? Is it the same as the existence of a particular substance? To answer these questions, I turn to the argument of Z 17 before I examine Aristotle's solution of the problem of the unity of matter and form.

Aristotle's concern in Z 17 is to seek the cause by which the matter is something. For example, these bricks and stones are a house by the essence or the form of the house. Moreover, Aristotle argues that the essence or the form is the primary cause of the existence of a particular substance by pointing out that the status of the cause is different from that of the material elements. In other words, the essence or the form is the cause by which the composite of matter and form exists. So what is sought in Z 17 is the cause of the existence of a composite.

But Aristotle treats the problem of the unity of matter and form in H 6 and he says that the unity of matter and form has no cause except the efficient cause. Then the unity of matter and form should be distinguished from the existence of a composite. Aristotle solves the problem by applying the concepts of potentiality and actuality to matter and form. I examine how he does that by interpreting the controversial passage in which he gives us a concrete example. And I find that we fall into difficulty when taking a sphere to be the composite of e.g. bronze and sphericality. Then I explain the significance of 'what is potentially sphere being actually sphere'.

Aristotle describes tragedy as 'di' eleou kai phobou perainousa ten ton toiouton pathematon katharsin'(Poetics 1449b27-28) . The description of musical katharsis in Politics has been thought to be the key to this katharsis clause. In Politics, katharsis is apparently viewed as a kind of medical purgation. As pity and fear are included among objects of purgation, medical katharsis might be expected in tragic performances as well. However, we cannot reduce tragic katharsis to a purgative effect. As Aristotle places the katharsis clause at the end of his definition of tragedy, we should expect the tragic katharsis to be the proper effect of tragedy itself.

Among many who attempt to interpret the katharsis clause, G. F. Else is unique in placing katharsis not in the emotions but in the structure of the tragic action. Tragic action, which should deal with pathos among blood kinship, must show that its hero does not have polluted intent in order to eschew moral disgust (miaron). It should contain only the pathos by hamartia. As a result of this 'purification of action', tragedy can be pitiful and fearful.

Although we cannot accept this interpretation and agree that katharsis in the definition should mean the purification of emotions, the katharsis of the tragic emotions necessarily involves katharsis of the action. In order for pity and fear to be aroused and then purified, the actions should be pitiful and fearful first. The lost second book of Poetics might have comprised a detailed explanation of katharsis as a process from its structural aspect to the purgative effect via purification.

Another subject expected in the lost second book is the theory of comedy. Tractatus Coislinianus may contain a rough sketch of the Aristotelian theory of comedy. We can reconstruct the essential part of this theory from scattered references on comedy in the extant Poetics. For this purpose, three points should be established. (1) Comedy is an imitation of an inferior action. As tragic action should not aim at all kinds of superior actions, but only pitiful and fearful ones, comic action should not aim at all kinds of inferior actions, but only the ridiculous. This ridiculous is defined in Poetics as hamartema that is neither destructive nor painful. In other words, it is an error without pathos. (2) Comic action should be 'a complete whole with magnitude'. Comedy should represent a change of fortune of inferior people from good to bad or bad to good. (3) Specific demands of the comic action should be derived from the fact it is an imitation of inferior action.

In chapter 13, actions of superior people are classified according to (a) its outcome and (b) the ethical character of the hero, as these factors decide the emotional response of the audience. Then all patterns except the fall of the �intermediate� are dismissed as either miaron or philanthropon, and not proper to tragedy. In chapter 14, Aristotle enumerates all possible combinations of pathos, reversal and recognition. Only pitiful and fearful combinations (those with reversal and recognition) are not rejected and other combinations are miaronn.

In comedy, as in tragedy, the plot with hamartia(= hamartema) is the best. The comic action differs from the tragic in the absence of pathos that is indispensable in tragedy. Comic action should also contain reversal and recognition. Reversal and recognition are elements which make the plot para ten doxan di' allela and produce a sense of wonder that helps the pleasure of learning in imitative arts. In the case of tragedy, they are useful to create pity and fear, and in comedy, the ridiculous (geloion).

Three kinds of comic katharsis can be recognized in Aristotelian theory of comedy, purification of comic action, purification and purgation of the comic emotion. The purgation is reported by Proclus and Iamblichus. The purification of comic action is achieved when comic poets renounce psogos and turn to the ridiculous, that is, the painless and not destructive error without bad intentions. Psogos in Poetics is a 'blamable fault'(LSJ) and it is a property of the comic action as well as geloion. As structural katharsis is katharsis of pity and fear from miaron in tragedy, so in comedy it is katharsis of ridiculous from psogos. To this cathartic plot corresponds the purification of the ridiculous (geloion) as comic emotion from phthonos. Plato in Philebus blamed comedy and its laughter for having painful phthonos mixed with its pleasure. Aristotle answers that comic emotion is purified of phthonos.

It is generally agreed that the agon scene between Teucer and the Atreidai over the burial of Ajax in the latter half of Sophocles' Ajax ruins the tragic pathos which is subtly developed in the course of the dramatic action up to the point of the suicide scene. Among three topics disputed in the debate --evaluation of Ajax' conduct, legitimacy of the Atreidai's generalship, and Teucer's birth (status)-- the last is most frequently alleged to be responsible for the drama's incongruity as having no relevance at all to the question of burial. Reexamination of this controversy, however, reveals that it not only holds an appropriate place in the debate but also relates the agon scene to the earlier part of the drama.

First, the issue of birth is effectively introduced in the agon to highlight the fundamental difference of the opponents of the debate in the moral principles, thus aptly pertaining to the dramatic context. The dispute over evaluation of Teucer's birth makes strikingly clear the contrast between the two sides, the Atreidai demanding that all Greeks should be under their supreme authority and no hubris should ever be tolerated, and Teucer, on the other hand, claiming that every warrior is equal and is subject to none but himself.

Secondly, the dispute over Teucer's birth relates the latter half of the drama to the first by calling into question the objective clarity of 'nobility of birth'. To the scornful reproach of his antagonists that he is a barbaros, a slave born of a captive, a non-hoplite, thus having no claim to privileges of free men, Teucer makes strong objections insisting that he prides in his nobility originating from the royal --both Greek and Trojan-- parents as well as in outstanding performance as an archer, and that the Atreidai too have barbaric elements in their allegedly noble birth. This argument of Teucer seriously undermines the Atreidai's assumptions concerning nobility of birth by posing two questions: first, by what standard is nobility evaluated, and second, to what extent is nobility of character determined by nobility of birth? Furthermore, Teucer's protest against the Atreidai's abusive attack on his birth reveals, in spite of himself, the problematic nature of his brother's belief in nobility, which is thoroughly presented in his discourses in the earlier part of the drama. Ajax's obsessive preoccupation with his noble birth, inherited from Telamon and to be inherited by Eurysakes, as well as self-chosen death as proof of it is put into question ironically in attempt to redeem the honor of his brother.

Understanding the agon scene in this manner allows us to interpret the scenes to follow as well. Odysseus' intervention as an arbiter can be seen as enactment of possible alternative to nobility by which Ajax abides determinedly to the death, Eurysakes' participation in the rite of burial as problematic presentation of consanguinity of the father and the son. It is incontestable, therefore, that the issue of Teucer's birth plays an indispensable role to grant coherent unity to the drama.

Achilles Tatius' Leukippe and Kleitophon consists of various doublings/ double structures. These include the shapes and structures of objects, developments of the plot, analogies or contrasts in human relationships, and rhetorical expressions or the like. Of course such doublings are often used in Greek romance as well as in other classical genres as scholars have frequently noted. However this feature is most remarkable in Achilles Tatius because double structures are stratified over and over again. This fact has already been remarked in relation to individual matters like ekphrases or the relationship between the two main female characters, but there seems to be no overall study of this motif. In this essay I therefore would like briefly to consider the character of these doublings in Achilles Tatius in various aspects. The starting-point in an investigation of Achilles Tatius' multiplicity must be the painting of Europa in the opening scene. At one level there is a simple contrast here with the high valuation the similar painting had received in the preface of Longus' Daphnis and Chloe, but in a more fundamental way it plays a central role in the multiplex structure of the work. Accordingly I examine the doublings in Achilles Tatius along with the description of the painting of Europa.

First, the picture of Europa implies the elopement of Kleitophon and Leukippe (and the abduction of Kalligone by Kallisthenes) which occurs in book 1 and 2 as well as their marriage at the end. Hence it anticipates the frame of the story. Secondly, in respect of human relationships too, a pattern of doublets overlaps one after another and spreads over the whole story. Thirdly, added to the framework mentioned above, a close observation of the painting of Europa proves further relation with the story. I divide the description into five elements, namely (a)pasture, (b)maidens, (c)colours, (d)Europa, (e)Eros, and look at the correspondence to the love-story step by step. Furthermore I also examine the picture of Andromeda and Prometheus and the picture of Philomela because these two pictures have many features in common with the Europa picture and are both carefully situated, at the beginning of book 3 and 5 respectively. And finally I indicate other double structures in the novel.

To conclude, Leukippe and Kleitophon is an intertexture of various double structures in respect of keywords, expressions, complexities of human relationships and the structure and development of the plot. The association of ideas 'doublings/ double structures' is stratified over and over again. In this multiplex structure the painting of the abduction of Europa plays a central role. In other words the ideas and expressions originating from the Europa painting run through the whole story of Leukippe and Kleitophon.

There has long been a controversy among scholars about how the pharmakoi, or ancient Greek human scapegoats, were treated at the end of the ritual, namely, whether they were killed or not. The disagreement among modern scholars has been caused by that among ancient writers: some of them state that the pharmakoi were put to death, while others indicate their being driven out of the community. But it makes little difference whether they were slain or expelled. Greater significance is to be attached to the fact that some of those scholiasts and lexicographers who refer to the pharmakos ritual assert that stoning was performed in it.

Of the two sources for the pharmakos ritual at Abdera the scholiast on Ovid's Ibis 467 states that in that city the scapegoat was killed with stones every year, whereas the other, the commentator on a Callimachus� line (fr.90 Pfeiffer), asserts that he was stoned until he was driven over the borders. There is a similar discrepancy between the two sources for the purificatory ritual at Massalia: while Servius states that the ritual was performed as often as the citizens were suffering from pestilence and that it culminated in mere casting out of the scapegoat, according to �Lactantius Placidus� the ritual was held annually and at the end of it the scapegoat was led out of the city beyond the boundaries and then was stoned to death.

What caused these discrepancies? As for the latter case, one could surmise that for some reasons Servius and 'Lactantius' misconstrued the sole fact respectively: in Massalia in very ancient times, whenever they suffered from pestilence, they would kill a scapegoat with stones so as to save their own lives; this practice was gradually established as an annually performed ritual for averting pestilence, and consequently the final treatment of the scapegoat changed into banishment from the city, possibly accompanied by a ceremonial stoning. Such may be the case also with Abdera and the scholiast on Ibis may have made a mistake similar to that of 'Lactantius'.

The following two sources provide some support for this view: (1) According to Helladius, the pharmakos ritual held at Athens has its origin in the unlawful death of Androgeos and the ensuing pestilential disease, which suggests that the Athenians purified their city with scapegoats to survive the plague. What was the ultimate fate of the original pharmakoi? A Plutarch's account (Mor. 297 b-c) and an episode in Philostratus' Life of Apollonius of Tyana (4.10) enable one to conjecture that they were stoned to death. And we are informed by Harpocration that the Athenians would expel two pharmakoi during the festival of Thargelia. Thus the same process of change as is supposed for Massalia (and perhaps for Abdera) can be detected here. (2) According to Ister, as cited by Harpocration, a man named Pharmakos stole the sacred bowls of Apollo and was stoned to death, and at the Thargelia (of an unknown Ionian city) certain things were performed in imitation of this event. Very probably the principal thing performed during the rite was a ceremonial stoning (or pelting with harmless objects such as bulbs of squills) accompanying the expulsion of the pharmakos. Here too the above-mentioned process can be well perceived.

From the materials shown above it may be infered that in very ancient times in some Greek cities, on the occasion of crises such as plague or famine or drought, to purify the city they would stone to death either the perpetrator of a sacrilegious act which was regarded as the cause of the disaster, or scapegoat(s), if it was of unknown origin. Such practice was gradually established as an annual event with the purpose of averting calamity, and consequently the expulsion of scapegoat(s) from the community became the essential element of the ritual and stoning changed into a symbolical, ceremonial act performed in casting out the scapegoat(s).

From the late fifth century, those who participated in politics regularly as quasi-professional politicians mainly came from the wealthy families. It is because politicians received no remuneration for their 'active political activities', such as moving decrees and bringing accusations, and they could not engage in their own works themselves while they were engaged in these political activities. Moreover they were required to perform some liturgies and sometimes faced dangers of being prosecuted by their political rivals and being heavily fined. In addition to these economic aspects, those who belonged to the upper class had an advantage with regard to political knowledge and information. Only in some exceptional cases did men from the middle or lower class have any chance to learn rhetorical skill, for getting rhetorical education required considerable expense. It also cost money to get a speech written by a logographer. Other fields of political knowledge and information(e.g. news on foreign affairs, knowledge about finance) were also nearly concentrated in the hands of those who were constantly engaged in politics or had access to the necessary resources, that is, men from a rich family or from a family of influence traditionally.

Under these circumstances, however, some sources show that not a few citizens from middle or lower class did some active political activities. Some acted regularly, others occasionally. How could they become active in politics? Many of them had some relations with the wealthy citizens or the political leaders. They took part in political activities through what's called 'patronage'. They could get economic and political support from their patrons. And then they performed active political activities reciprocally for their patrons. Besides they could get necessary information and knowledge about their political activities from their patrons without leaving their own work for a long time. In some cases, the Athenian citizens recognized them as politicians on the base of their patron's influence.

Thus it was patronage that enabled and prompted citizens from the middle or lower class to be active, even if occasionally, in the politics of the Athenian democracy, where the economic constraints and the concentration of political knowledge and information had ensured that quasi-professional politicians played central roles. According to M. H. Hansen, in addition to the political leaders, there was an important group of politically minded citizens who were active, even to the exent of proposing decrees, but not regularly. And these citizens amounted to some 300-600 at any meetings of the ecclesia. If the circumstances under which the patronage was employed are taken into account, it is possible to guess that most of the group might be consisted of citizens from the middle or lower class. Then much more citizens from the middle or lower class might be engaged in the active political activities, if only occasionally, through patronage than usually believed.

In De finibus, Cicero and other speakers, who represent various schools of philosophy, use many examples from Roman history to support their arguments. However it is perhaps only Cicero who copiously employed actual historical examples to argue the idea of a purely theoretical highest good. Further, Cicero stresses the common ground between the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric, previously viewed as entirely separate. The frequency and nature of these historical examples vary widely. This aspect of De finibus has most often been overlooked by contemporary researchers, being regarded as a mere digression from the main discourse. Exceptions to this trend are the studies on Book II by J. Leonhardt and A. Brinton.

While traditionally De finibus has been regarded as not only inconsistent (e.g. by H.Uri), but also as lacking in originality (due to the fact that most of the political and philosophical ideas of Cicero are derived from philosophical schools), one can take his use of historical examples to be unique and worthy of study. The different use of examples between the Books is also of interest. In Book I Torquatus maintains that the philosophy of Epicurus would fit well with the Roman exempla maiorum and state ideal. However, in direct contradiction to Torquatus in Book I, in Book II Cicero states with the help of many examples that the standard of behavior should be based on virtue rather than pleasure. In Book III Cato has this view and Cicero agrees in principle. Cato confirms this idea, insisting that Stoicism would best suit Rome. However, contrary to Cicero's usual style, Cato does not support this view with historical examples, to prove the Stoic philosophy to be consistent with the Roman exempla maiorum. The only examples he gives(3,75) are of evil Romans, lost in vice and traitors to their state.

This imbalance in Book III can be regarded as an expression of criticism on Cicero's part: namely, that the Stoa lacks the practical rhetoric necessary to realize its ideas within the sphere of Roman politics and society in general. This criticism is in accord with the discussion between Cicero and Cato in Pro Murena. Exempla maiorum are the most suitable rhetorical techniques for the philosophical arguments which deliberate between honestum and utile. They are also appropriate for the problem of summum bonum with which De finibus deals.

At the same time the characters used are clearly there to express Cicero's political ideology of pro patria. Cicero uses examples in order to weave this ideology in a purely theoretical philosophical work. In Cicero's use of historical examples appear labores gloriosi, with which he attempts to unify the role of politician, philosopher and orator. Cicero nowhere says that he himself or anyone else embodies this ideal. Man cannot live only with virtue --as the Stoas insist--, however, he can achieve certain progress towards this virtue. This progressio ad virtutem expressed in the example of 4,65-7 would be exactly the summum bonum which the human being can aim at.