Journal of Classical Studies XLVIII(2000)

  • Michio Oka, An interpretation of Oidipus Tyrannos
  • Shogo Hirata, The Helen Scene in Euripides' Troades
  • Yugi Furuyama, State Control over the Wine-trade of Thasos in the 5th Century B.C.
  • Asako KURIHARA, Andocides in 415B.C.: Kinship, Hetaireia, and Polis
  • Kiyoaki AKAI, The Concept of Deity in Aristotle's De Philosophia, Fr.16 Ross
  • RYUZAN TANAKA, The Problem of Relativism in Sextus Empiricus
  • Taro Hyuga, The Defence of the Capitol -- A Critique of Otto Skutsch
  • Yoshihiro Oshiba, Catullus on Oratory : Literary Criticism in c. 44
  • Tetsuko Yamada, The OriginaIity of the Thebais




    An interpretation of Oidipus Tyrannos
    Michio Oka
    The stories of the past oracles(711ff. and 774ff.) as told by Iokaste and Oidipus have a common feature in "structure" that the fear of an oracle makes the person(s) concerned attempt to escape its fulfilment, only to bring about the events foretold by it.
    Now an analysis of the play reveals that there is a similar pattern in the actions:
    A. The fear of Teiresias' prophecy of the banishment as Laios' murderer which Oidipus suspects to be part of a conspiracy makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by condemning the supposed conspirator Kreon to death, only to learn, after the release of the latter, the details of Laios' death from Iokaste who, wishing to free him from his fear, does the opposite.
    B. The renewed fear(cf. 747) of Teiresias' prophecy makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by summoning as a sole hope Laios' former herdsman who reported the king's murder by "robbers".
    C. The fear of the oracle(incest) makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by refusing to return to Corinth, only to learn from the Corinthian that he, when infant, was about to be exposed by Laios' herdsman. It is only natural, seeing he has just now confessed his intense fear of the oracle(incest) in 973ff., that the fear of the oracle(patricide and incest) is renewed when he knows that he was an unwanted child probably of Theban origin.
    D. The renewed fear of the past oracle makes him attempt to escape its fulfilment by interrogating the herdsman about his parents(and by avoiding meeting them), only to find the dire truth.
    There is apparently a break between A. B. and C. D. The Corinthian's arrival itself is an unexpected surprise not only for Oidipus and Iokaste but also for the spectators, for it occurs not as a consequence of the previous actions but as if Apollon responded to Iokaste's prayer(919ff.). The unity of plot, however, is kept by Oidipus' attempts to escape fulfilment of prophecy and oracle. Teiresias' prophecy is essentially the same in content as the past oracle, the difference being that the former foretells the results of the latter. It is in C. that Aristotle(Po. 1452a22ff.) sees the play's peripeteia. This peripeteia is brought about "in accordance with probability or necessity", that is, "because of, not after"(1452a21) Oidipus' attempts to escape fulfilment of prophecy and oracle.
    Oidipus seeks the truth about Laios' murder and his parentage, but he does not seek it for itself but in order to escape fulfilment of Teiresias' prophecy and of the past oracle. What finally causes his ruin is not his quest for the truth but his attempts to escape fulfilment of prophecy and oracle, as in the case of his father(711ff.). Through knowledge of this fact Oidipus comes to recognize and accept the fate as his own.

    The Helen Scene in Euripides' Troades
    Shogo Hirata
    The agon scene of Euripides' Troades is difficult to relate to the main course of the dramatic action. Apart from its bafflingly sophistic tone, there are seemingly odd points in it: (1)Hecuba requests Menelaus to give her enemy Helen an opportunity for apology. (2)Menelaus allows Hecuba's request and takes sides with her. (3)Menelaus allows the debate whose outcome is already determined. These points have encouraged some critics to see the scene as an interlude with purely intellectual appeal not relevant to the theme of the play. By re-examining these three points and the contents of the debate, this paper attempts to clarify the significance of the Helen scene and relate it to the overall structure of the play.
    Close reading of ll. 873-75 shows Menlaus' reluctance to kill his wife Helen, in spite of his apparent contempt toward her. He is anxious to play the role of an executioner in order to refute the charge of uxoriousness hurled at him by the Greeks, because he is surrounded by the very soldiers (opaones, 880) who hurled that charge at him and now hope Helen's death. The whole agon is a play within a play performed before the audience on the stage, common soldiers as mute actors. Observing that Menelaus is on the verge of surrender to Helen's charm, Hecuba tries to take vengeance upon her, taking over the will of Cassandra and Andromache. Hecuba's request for debate is not a convenient clue to introduce an intellectual entertainment, but a desperate attempt to secure the execution of Helen. Hecuba counts on the presence of Greek soldiers as witnesses of Menelaus' decision, and he is forced to allow the debate under the pressure of their mute presence as she expected. The whole debate scene can be seen as a re-production of the Judgement of Paris by Hecuba: she appeals to the virtue of goddesses Hera and Athena, and in doing so, she recalls the discussion by Cassandra (= the virgin goddess Athena) and Andromache (= the chaste wife goddess Hera) in order to refute Helen (=Aphrodite). Hecuba nearly wins with her power of logos, but at that moment Helen embraces Menelaus' neck and knee for supplication. This physical contact, the power of Eros, persuades Menelaus (= Paris). Hecuba's last hope, vengeance, is lost.

    State Control over the Wine-trade of Thasos in the 5th Century B.C.
    Yugi Furuyama
    We have two Thasian inscriptions on which the regulations of wine-trade are engraved．One Inscription (a) is SEG．XXXVI，Ｎr．790，dated back to 480-60 B.C. The other (b) is IG．XII，Suppl．Ｎr．347，dated to the last quarter of the 5th century B.C. The inscription (a) records only the latter half of a law，while (b) has two laws[(bI) and (bII)] which are basically different each other from the viewpoint of text form. So we have three laws of wine-trade in Thasos.
    On penal regulations and prosecution proceedings, there are many things in common between the law of inscription (a) and the law (bI). The law (bI) is the regulation of the purchase of wine. So must be the law of inscription (a). Law (bII) is composed of three clauses in one of which the main contents are lost. The first lause holds only prosecution proceedings, the second prevents Thasian ships from bringing foreign wine in Thasian territory, and the third prohibits the sale of wine by false containers. The second and third clauses refer to a law which forbids the dilution of wine with water. Therefore this is the law against something dishonest like pouring water into wine, perhaps pouring foreign wine into Thasian wine. That is to say, (bII) could regulate the sale of wine. Why are two laws of different character written together in the same stone？ The reason is that regulations of (b) focus on the wine broker, who buy and sell Thasian wine.
    On the basis of (bII) in which we find not only government officials being in charge of continental territory, but also an import restriction to the foreign wine, most scholars have insisted that Thasos practised "protectionism" ,and that the policy was carried out under the Thasian oligarchy after the revolt against Athenian imperialism around the end of the 5th century B.C. The clause (2) in (bII), however, does not put an embargo on all wine import. Consequently, we should not immediately assign it to a specified political position of the city-state. The legal improvement of the period including (bII) should be studied in the context of the development of Thasian wine production and trade.
    The law of the inscription (a) and the chronology of "protostamp amphorae" prove that by the end of the archaic age Thasos produced and exported her wine. But Thasian wine was confused with "biblinos oinos", which was the good wine from Thrace opposite Thasos island. The confusion seems to have reflected that the Thasian authorities could not easily control over the wine produced on her continental territory. The high reputation and popularity of Thasian wine could be established around the last quarter of the 5th century B.C. It is at the period that Thasos improved her legal system to the wine-trade to cope with its development.
    In the works of Athenian old comedy at the same period and the "hermocopidai" inscription(414/3 B.C.), we find the great Athenian interest in Thasian wine. It is probable, therefore, that the Thasian legal improvement was influenced by the Athenian interest. It is important, however, that in spite of Athenian influence Thasos has developed the state control over wine-trade in the direction which she had taken from the period of the inscription (a). The state control over wine-trade was the fundamental policy with which she had to make herself free from the existing financial structure that depended heavily on mine resources. It was to be Thasian principal policy under any type of the government or any political position of the city-state.

    Andocides in 415 B.C.: Kinship, Hetaireia, and Polis
    Asako KURIHARA
    Obligations towards personal kins and friends frequently conflict with obligations to the broader society. Such a dilemma between private and public responsibilities in Athenian democracy is here explored. The case of Andocides, who decided to inform against his friends on their anti-social mutilation of the hermai in 415 B.C., provides a rare opportunity to compare reports of different contemporary attitudes. The real facts of the case are not here considered; rather the reaction of public opinion.
    (1) It is legitimate to deal with the hermai affair independently of the profanations of the Mysteries. While the affair of the Mysteries was a social phenomenon, repeated and secretly prevailed on wider range of Athenian society, there is a good reason to regard the mutilation as the intention of a single hetaireia.
    (2) Andocides maintains that the mutilation was to confirm the pistis(fidelity) of his hetaireia. He dares to explain their offense to have been just for friendship of their hetaireia.
    (3) After the offense, his fellow members of the hetaireia demanded his silence for the sake of friendship. On his account, it was not until he was jailed with his father and other kinsmen on suspicion of the offense, and entreated by his cousin Charmides to tell the whole truth to save them, that he thought of informing against the hetaireia members . Here contemporary sources show problematic discrepancies in the recognition of his betrayal.
    (4)According to Thucydides, the main object of the persuasion was that Andocides should save himself and the polis at the same time. On the other hand, Andocides explains in On the Mysteries that the main point of Charmides' entreaty was that Andocides should decide between kinsmen and fellow hetairoi; he apologizes for his decision to save many innocent kinsmen by informing against only four friends. He argues, contrary to Thycydides, that his own benefit was out of consideration; even the interest of the polis seems to be a secondary matter, coming into consideration only after he had decided to inform. The same process of decision-making is prefered also in On his return.
    (5)However, in Against Andocides, Andocides is accused of betraying both kinsmen and friends in order to save himself. The point at issue is whether his behavior can be condemned in view of private friendship, not its legitimacy in view of public benefit.
    It is concluded that, at least in the world of forensic speeches, Andocides was neither required to betray his fellow hetairoi for the benefit of the polis, nor justified in doing so. Similar views are found to be expressed in other forensic speeches. In classical Athens, the public sphere did not hold superiority over the private one; rather, the opposite.

    The Concept of Deity in Aristotle's De Philosophia, Fr.16 Ross
    Kiyoaki AKAI
    The fragments of Book III of the early dialogue De Philosophia show Aristotle pursuing his studies on Deity and the universe. Above all, fr.16, taken from Simplicius' Commentary in De Caelo 288.28-289.15, is characterized by its reference to the philosophical proof of the existence of Deity as well as that of the immutability of Deity. As J.Bernays pointed out, the latter proof presupposes the former. In this paper, we will clarify the obvious, but unspoken premise of the former proof, and explain in what sense the latter proof presupposes the former.
    The discussion on the existence of Deity appears in the first part of the fragment. "In general, where there is a better there is also a best. Since, then, among existing things one is better than another, there is also something that is best, which will be the divine." Most commentators (e.g., W.Jaeger, P.Wilpert, and C.J.De Vogel) have ignored the (obvious to Aristotle, therefore not mentioned) premise of this proof of the existence of Deity as something that is best. Behind this proof lies the premise that a series of better things is not endless: of which Aristotle seems to be quite convinced. Taking this premise into consideration, we can properly appreciate the validity of the proof of the existence of Deity without the help of the scholastic argumentum ex gradibus, the theory of forms and the realistic scale of entities.
    With regard to the proof of the immutability of Deity, the following choices are enumerated and ruled out one by one. The choices are as follows, "Now that which changes is changed either by something else or by itself, and if by something else, either by something better or by something worse, and if by itself, either to something worse or through desire for something nobler." These choices are ruled out on the grounds of the existence of Deity as something that is best, which proved out to be true in the first part of the fragment. The transition of time which change in general presupposes is half hidden in this proof, but this presupposition is once taken into account, then, left out by means of the nature of "best" that Deity bears. This is the point of this proof which most commentators have not been aware of.
    So far as Fr.16 is concerned, the immutability of Deity can be understood in the same way we recognize that in the Corpus. This conclusion raises the questions, "Did Aristotle in early dialogues have the same opinion on the immutability of Deity as he did in the Corpus?" and "Is fr.16 the genuine fragment of De Philosophia?" But we should bear it in mind that the fragmentary nature of the dialogue does not permit much speculation on what Aristotle thought Deity to be.

    The Problem of Relativism in Sextus Empiricus
    RYUZAN TANAKA
    In Sextus' argument against moral values, especially in Outlines of Pyrrhonism ｡(PH3) and Against the Ethicists(M11), we are shown statements which appear to subscribe to relativism(SR),e.g."Nothing is by nature (phusei) good." The purpose of this paper is to consider whether these SR are coherent with the sceptical attitude manifested in PH1, that is epoche(suspension of judgment).
    Over the last few decades, this problem has been the subject of controversy. One reaction has been to accuse Sextus of incoherence. Annas & Barnes have held that Sextus conflates relativism with scepticism. Annas concludes that Sextus is a philistine about ethics. The other reaction has been to try to defend Sextus. McPherran regards SR as the reports of subjective affections, which involve no commitment to the truth of the external objects, and locates SR in the sceptical strategy. In both cases, however, it is agreed that SR in themselves are alien substances to scepticism.
    In recent studies, Bett proposes a new interpretation. He regards SR as the conclusion, which Sceptic himself adopts. He pays attention to the relation of SR with Scepticﾕs happiness. For Sextus says in M11 that SR lead to ataraxia(tranquillity). In addition, Bett emphasizes the difference between M11 and PH3. Considering the chronology of Sextus' works, he presumes that SR (in M11) are relics of a phase in the history of Pyrrhonism far earlier than Sextus himself, whose attitude is suspension of judgment (in PH1-3). I agree with Bett in thinking that SR are Sceptic's conclusion. However, I do not share his chronological solution, because similarly in M11 and PH3, both SR and epoche play important roles in relation to the sceptical aim. The question arises again: Are SR coherent with the suspension of judgment?
    I want to throw new light on the concept of metriopatheia(moderate affection) which is another aim of scepticism. Sextus says "The aim of Sceptic is tranquillity in regard to belief and moderate affection in regard to things unavoidable"(PH1.30). Moreover, it is noteworthy that this concept can be found only in arguments against moral values, and that Sextus explicitly declares SR only in that case. It will be clear from these facts that Sextus has been aware of a property of moral values. However, I do not mean that Sextus affirms this distinction. For Sceptic is, as Sextus says, the person who suspends judgment about everything (M11.150). I therefore conclude that SR remain as a result of suspension of judgement in regard to things unavoidable. Concerning moral values, after we suspend judgment about their nature, we can not detach ourselves from them perfectly. This is because we are placed unavoidably and accidentally into definite circumstances, that have definite moral values. SR mean this. To accept SR is not the defeat of scepticism.　For only Sceptic can be in a state of moderate affection without having additional belief: this is good/bad by nature. It is not too far from the truth to say that SR belong to different category from two categories, what is the case by nature and what appears.

    The Defence of the Capitol: A Critique of Otto Skutsch
    Taro Hyuga
    According to the traditional version of the legend concerning the Gallic occupation of Rome in 390 B.C., M. Manlius, awakened by the cackling of geese, miraculously saved the Capitol from the night attack by the Gauls who, having occupied the rest of the city, now intended to capture also the citadel. Since 1953 Otto Skutsch, an authority on Ennian studies, has persistently asserted on the basis of the fragment Ann. 227-8 Sk. (= 164-5 V.2) that Ennius, in defiance of the tradition, talked rather of the fall of the Capitol. The present article counters his theory on three points and aims to establish the probability that Ennius adhered to the traditional version.
    Firstly, the fragment does not provide sufficient evidence for asserting that Ennius spoke of the fall. The verb cruentant does not in itself indicate that the vigiles are massacred, still less that the Capitol was taken. Skutsch denies the imperfective character of cruentant used with repente. As various instances show, however, this adverb does not necessarily preclude an inchoative connotation of the verb with which it is used. It is therefore possible that the fragment talks merely of relatively light wounds sustained by the vigiles. In one of the preceding books of the Annals (probably the fourth), Ennius dwelt on the more positive aspect of the story for the Romans (Manlius' prowess); in the seventh, to which this fragment belongs, he underlines in retrospect the negative aspect (the wounding of the vigiles) to make vivid the panic of the Romans in face of a renewed Gallic incursion (225 B.C.). This device is used also by Polybius (2.23.7) and Silius (6.554-6).
    Secondly, there is no good reason to doubt Propertius' testimony concerning the contents of the Annals (3.3.1-14) nor to read cecini instead of cecinit (line 7). As Butler and Barber have pointed out, the phrase regiaque Aemilia vecta tropaea rate (8) refers to the triumph of Aemilius Regillus (191 B.C.), not to that of Aemilius Paullus (168 B.C.), so it is unnecessary to suppose that the catalogue (7-12) includes episodes which Ennius does not relate. Furthermore, as Kambylis observes, the reading cecinit is more suitable for the context. Therefore, the phrase anseris et tutum voce fuisse Iovem (12) clearly means Ennius' reference to a successful defence of the Capitol.
    Thirdly, in the light of the patriotic significance attached to the Capitol in the Republican age, it is implausible that Ennius should have related its fall in the Annals. The Capitol had become the symbol of Rome's everlasting glory at latest by third century B.C.. And a passage in Cicero Pro Archia 22 confirms the public function of the Annals. Lucan (5.27) and Tertullian (Apol. 40) certainly hint at the fall, but it is wrong to suppose that Ennius could have been as free from the patriotic ideas as these writers of a later period when the Capitol had already lost its symbolic meaning in consequence of Rome's moral decadence.
    These three points makes it more probable that Ennius spoke of the successful defence of the Capitol. The episode would have fitted in with the patriotic flavour of the historical epic and must have been one of the highlights of the Annals.

    Catullus on Oratory : Literary Criticism in c. 44
    Yoshihiro Oshiba
    Catullus 44 has many obscurities, among which the most important is the textual problem in the last line 21 since it affects the meaning of the curse in 18-20 and of the poem as a whole. In this paper I try to defend the MS reading legit and thus to establish the unity of the poem as a literary critique against a frigid speech.
    Lachmann's legi, followed by most scholars, involves serious difficulties. First, the dramatic background of the poem cannot be explained without distortion. Secondly, the last line does not fit in well with the context and the joke lacks in point.
    The MS reading legit, which must mean private reading like legi in 12, is confirmed by its immediate context, that is: (1) the implication of 21. Consider the purpose of Sestius' invitation. As can be inferred from 10-2 and 18-9, he had a secret desire to be praised by his guests. But he invites just after (tunc ... cum ...) he read a bad book, which implies his insensibility to the defect of his work. Here Catullus attacks his blindness and self-conceit. (2) the expression of the curse gravedinem ... ferat frigus in 19-20. Since the frigus here means the frigidity of speech, the aim of the curse is Sestius' cold because of a bad speech just as in 12-3. If Sestius read his 'bad book' himself, he is also expected to catch cold. Line 21 shows that the curse may come true and explains why it takes such a form. (3) the context of 18-21. In 18-9 Catullus pretends to make a vow that if he should take up Sestius' writings again he would submit to another cold, but in 20 he turns the curse from himself to Sestius (apopompe) with a para prosdokian. With this device he keeps his vow never to repeat the same error of reading Sestius' work, and in 21 makes the curse all the more effective because it is Sestius himself who read the bad book. Thus legit suits the context perfectly, bringing a clever joke to a finish.
    The nature of frigus further confirms it. In Greek rhetorical theory psykron denotes bad taste showing itself in excessive style, and the frigus of Sestius' speech is implied as such by the food metaphor in 7-13. And the concept of psykron coincides with that of kakozelon (Volkmann 406, Lausberg ､ 1077), about which see Quintilian, Inst. 8.3.56. The defect of kakozelon - psykron consists in the author's excessive pursuit of virtus, but the author, lacking iudicium, is unaware of the defect but rather flatters himself on the work, while the audience or readers feel cold at this as bad taste. The author's blindness and self-conceit, noted in (1) above, has the same root as frigus. The last part of Catullus 44 shows such a situation: Sestius had a chance to realize the frigus because he read his own book, but he is still blind to it and invites the poet, who answers with a curse.
    Also in c. 84 a frigid speaker Arrius is criticized, because 10 horribilis and 12 Hionios suggest his frigidity. In vv. 3-4 Catullus points to his self-conceit and kakozelon (n.b. the similarity to 44.21), which leads to frigus. Catullus, a doctus poeta, was certainly well acquainted with such minutiae of rhetorical theory.
    What is the meaning of the whole poem? Stylistically it is a travesty of the frigid style, and in content this mock-hymn is a playful device to make literary criticism in metaphorical terms. The first part of the poem implies the urbanitas of the villa as opposed to rusticitas of Senstius' speech (n.b. his similarity to Suffenus in c. 22, e.g. 22.9 legas = 44.12 legi, 22.17 [+ 16 cum] = 44.21). And the 'god' of the farm who cures the literary cold and who has authority to punish the poet's peccatum (17) of gluttony, which is a metaphor for anti-Callimachean taste, may be identified with Callimachean Apollo (cf. fr. 1.22-4, 32-5). So far the 'hymn' to this god is an oblique way to criticize Sestius' speech and to suggest the literary principles of the poet. But in the last curse Catullus makes direct criticism that the true sin lies with Sestius. If it consists in his blindness and self-conceit, the meaning of the curse must be: 'He should feel and realize the frigus of his own speech'. This is an attack on his lack of iudicium and an admonition to make self-criticism, which is an important principle for the polish and refinement in Catullan poetics, and therefore the vow-and-curse by that tutelary god is meaningful.
    Now the unity of the poem is obvious: with a series of metaphors the literary criticism is consistent all through the poem. In spite of its casual appearance this is a carefully elaborated piece of playful wit and erudition. In this sense it embodies Catullan urbanitas as an ideal in his poetics.

    The OriginaIity of the Thebais
    Tetsuko Yamada
    Statius' Thebais follows the example of the "divine Aeneis" (Theb.I2.816). But it is more than imitation. Thebais has its own pecuIiar tone. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the originality of the Thebais by comparison with its model.
    First, Laius' appearance in Eteocles' dream(Theb. 2.89-133) is compared with the episode of AIIecto-Turnus(Aen.7.413-4 72). The three main characteristics of the Thebais can be summarized as foIIows.
    1) Fいerce hatred within a family: Statius lays stress on this deep-rooted human emotion. Although in Aen. AIIecto shows hatred, she does so on account of imprudent words against her infernal dignity; in other words, it is a mere accident.
    On the other hand , Laius' hatred of his grandson has continued from the very moment of the patricide and wiII never perish. Moreover, the family relationship makes his hatred fiercer. Such gIoomy emotion of Laius shows a lack of pietas, which was essential to the families in Aeneis.
    2) Desire for autocracy: Turnus' defiance of Aeneas depends (partly) on his patriotic motivation. On the other hand, Eteocles desires to keep his autocratic power onIy. He does not defend fatherland or citizen. He has no sense of responsibility to his status. His people do not put reliance on him either but hate this tyrant. Here again we can see a lack of pietas.
    3) Fear as a motive of an assault: Eteocles is stimulated to the war by his fearfulness. Both Turnus and Eteocles are seized by an awful fear, but the fear of Eteocles is different from Turnus'. It was an infernal appearance of Allecto that horrified Turnus, whose feeIing graduaIIy changes into madness and anger. Fear can not be said to be an immedlate cause for the war. Eteocles, on the other hand, is terrified by the news of his brother's betrothal which must be a great menace to his throne. Then he immediately launches an attack. Thus, his fear is a motive to promote the battIe, rather than to prevent it. Such a function of fear has not been seen in previous works.
    These three characteristics are confirmed also by further comparisons; for exampIe, the Katabasis of Amphiaraus (Theb. 8.1-126) with the scene of Charon (Aen. 6.384-41O) . The third (fear as a motive of an assault) frequently occurs in Thebais (for example, 5.347-358, I2.682-697).
    Thus, aIthough Statius seemingIy foIIows VergiIius, he fiIIs his epic with impious emotions, which give it unique characteristics.