In Book V of the Republic Plato gives us the paradox that best talented women must have the equal education with talented men and share leadership with guardian men. However, this seemingly egalitarian view conflicts with misogynistic remarks in the argument of the paradox. Plato suggests (1) the male is superior to the female in respect to almost every occupation (455C-D) and (2) women are weaker than men (455E, 456A, 457A). In this paper I will discuss this discrepancy between his egalitarian proposal and misogynistic remarks. First, I will try to present a consistent interpretatiorL Second, I will investigate the basis of his proposal. Finally, I will analyze the close connection with Book VII of the Laws where Plato reconsiders the equality of sexes.
Regards to (1) I point out that this is a kind of ad hominem argument. Men's superiority was held by the ancient Athenian people but not by Plato himself. He confirms the common chauvinistic belief and makes the most of it for introducing the equality between the sexes into his ideal state. As for (2) it does not mean general inferiority including inferior intellectual ability but just means the physical inferiority. To support my reading, let me indicate the textual evidence that Plato uses the asthenesteron throughout to refer to weaker qualification of women and iskhuroteron to stronger one of men. These words mean physically inferior and superior first of all. They derive from the analogy of watchdogs where there is no implication that female dogs are inferior to male dogs in respect of intellectual ability. Furthermore, Plato carefully distinguishes the meaning of hiskhuroteron (stronger) from that of both, kreittôn (superior) and beltiôn (better) in the Gorgias (488B8-489B6).
What is the basis of his proposal ? 1 largely agree with Vlastos' suggestion. Plato takes over Socratic doctrine that virtue is the same in women as in men. In Plato's metaphysics a soul should be away from a ,body as far as possible to access to the world of Forms. The manliness does not have any important role in this process. I refute the claim that Plato treats souls as if they are gendered. The reason is that the aptitude for Guardians does not have any connection with the manliness or a gender (487A).
I compare Book V of the Republic with Book VII (780D-781D) of the Laws to see Plato's final treatment of the equality of sexes. The latter argument has a very similar structure to the former. Plato utilizes the prejudice that women's nature is inferior to men's to apply perfectly equal political systems to both sexes at 781A-B. He is convinced that if it were ordained that every practice is to be shared in common by women and men, it would be better for the happiness of the city (781B, 805A).
I conclude that Plato is not a feminist because he is not concerned with women's rights but with justice and happiness of the city. However, he is the first Western philosopher to work out a clear thesis that difference of sex is irrelevant to the aptitude of any occupations and every political system should be shared by men and women to make the better world.
Many commentators have interpreted that the flux-theory does not occupy a central position in Heraclitus' doctrine, because they think the view of logos and metron (Frr. l, 30) cannot be consistent with the emphasis of the flux-theory. But the flux-theory, which characterises the dynamic view of Heraclitus' philosophy, should not be treated so lightly. My aim in this paper is to elucidate how the unity of logos gets on with the incessant change.
I think that the river fragments (Frr. 12, 49a, 91) are authentic and prove positively the neccesity of change as Vlastos suggested. So, what Heraclitus meant to illustrate in the river fragments is not the preservation of the river's identity and especially the measure which must inhere in cosmological change. There is another point of view emphasized here. We should notice that Heraclitus' river image does not imply the view of difference without identity as Cratyrus thought, but that of difference which presupposes identity and the latter supplies the doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum. In short, such difference in identity, i. e. opposition of unity, is his significant contention as well as unity of opposition. That is the meaning of Heraclitus' contradiction.
However, the more significant problem here is that of logos. We must think that it is an unsound argument that the notion of logos' unity is inconsistent with the emphasis of the flux-theory. Compared with logos' unity, the flux as the dynamism in appearance should not be regarded as negative. This is because, for Heraclitus, the reality as unity and the appearance as plurality are one and the same. The point is that the hidden harmony of logos (Fr. 54) unites the antagonistic oppositions and simultaneously opens toward them. Concerning plurality and unity, the harmony of logos is in itself a dynamic notion, which turns toward unity on the one hand and toward difference on the other (back-turning harmony : Fr. 51, grasping : Fr. 10). In this sense, the dynamic principle, which includes both the flux and the unity is on the basis of Heraclitus' philosophy. This dynamic notion is also represented in the doctrine on fire. I would like to emphasize that this notion is based on the concept of the ever living fire, which is both unity and plurality (Fr. 30, 90). Therefore, it is important that the everlasting logos is the same as the ever living fire.
It should be concluded, from what has been said above, that the fiux-theory occupies a central position in Heraclitus' doctrine. The dynamic notion of logos is symbolized by the flux.
In the Apology Socrates (Soc.) admits that he possesses the so-called Human Wisdom (HW), anthrôpinê sophia which makes him the wiser person among people despite his disavowal of any other knowledge or tekhnê My aim in this paper is to understand what HW is, and also the relationship between HW and his philosophy. Soc. avows HW in order to explain his extraordinary life, that is, why he has devoted himself to philosophy. HW does not mean ordinary opinion, but it is the source of his mission. And we must understand HW through his investigation of the meaning of the Delphic oracle (DO), 'There is no one wiser than Soc.'.
First we should note that the DO is a riddle for Soc. because he is already aware of having no wisdom. Second, it is a significant wisdom about the good and fine which Soc. seeks for and can not find on himself and other reputed people. Soc.' interpretation of the riddle is that human beings can not possess such significant wisdom, but only the awareness of their lack of the wisdom.
Soc.' philosophy is to persuade himself and other people to care about souls i.e. how our souls can be the best possible. For the sake of the philosophy he cross-examines other people using his dialectical method, whether we pretend to have the significant wisdom. In his philosophy he always tries to introduce us to HW.
Why should we care about souls, and how can Soc. be aware of his lack of this wisdom ? We must understand one conviction at the base of his philosophy, that is, there must be a standard of values (such as just, good and beautiful) upon which we make our lives better. If we should specify what Soc. knows, we must point out this conviction which does not come under the dichotomy between knowledge (epistêmê) and belief (doxa).
However, the DO tells Soc. that no one can learn such standard from other people unlike other expert knowledge. This means that Soc. faces the uncertain situation in which we all live. Although we need a standard of values for our good lives, we are lacking in this respect. Soc.' HW means not only the awareness of this lack, but also that we should live with this awareness in order to endure the uncertainity of our lives.
The natural teleology of Aristotle (NT) means that each natural thing is generated for some goal, or that nature generates each thing for some goal. In this paper, I will show that NT is introduced in order to inquire and formulate an efficient cause in natural sciences (physica), with arguing against the extended interpretation of NT (ENT). ENT, which is allegedly based on the rainfall example in the main text of NT (Ph. B 8), says that NT explains the harmony of the entire natural world somehow.
First I set NT in Aristotle's project of scientific research, According to him, sciences should be formulated in necessary (per se) connections of terms, as is suggested in APo. NT claims the per se connection of nature with a final cause: it is because nature generates a thing for some goal that a natural thing is suitable to its goal. Nature (i.e. an efficient cause) imposes some form, which is identical with the goal, on some matter. Thus NT is introduced so as to inquire and formulate an efficient cause in accordance with Aristotle's conception of sciences.
Second, let me justify the reading above. (a) The unmoved mover, as is involved in ENT, is outside the scope of natural sciences. In the NT context (Ph. B8, PA I) no efficient cause refers to the eternity of species even in the case of a generation of a whole body. (b) The effectiveness of NT in scientific research is indicated in the NT context. Aristotle uses (non-uniform) parts and makes the role of efficient causes (i.e. the way to organize things) clearer and more accurate, because functions (i.e. final causes) of parts are evidently clear and simple, while a function of a whole body is oomplicated.
Finally, let me interpret the argument containing the rainfall example. It has two stages: (i) to reject the rival theory as impossible, (ii) to argue for NT in the very place where it is collapsed. This rival theory is, impossible, because it explains some phenomenon both by chance and by nature at the same time. But in explaining the rainfall this theory only uses nature in its own way (i.e. necessity) and doesn't use chance. Therefore Aristotle need not oppose the rival theory of rainfall, as is interpreted in ENT, and indeed he supports such a view in his other writings. This undermines the ENT interpretation Chance appears only in the other example (i.e. the generation of teeth), and is used in Empedocles' theory of the survival of the fittest I show (a) how the rival theory of this case is impossible, and (b) how Aristotle is justified in arguing for NT. The chance in Empedocles corresponds to Aristotle's view of chance (i.e. a per accidens efficient cause). Aristotle can claim instead of chance a per se efficient cause in his scheme of scientific inquiry. This is the real meaning of NT. The harmony of the entire natural world must be investigated only after the inquiry of each natural thing, not before.
As to the opinion that the words kathaper eirêtai occurring in the definition of peripeteia refer to 9.1452a4 i.e., the words para tên doxan "unexpected", a question has arisen : how can we properly speak of surprise, and its concomitant emotional effects in a case like the Oedipus where everyone knows the story in advance? Setting aside this question, however, I seek in this paper to clarify the structure of peripeteia as change (metabolê), in particular as change which is paradoxical yet logical (para tên doxan kai kata to eikos ê anagkaion) .
Else's solution of the problem is to put stress on dramatic autonomy. We anticipate the peripety "on the basis of knowledge which is external to the play itself" (Else p. 346) . But I think he overemphasized this point of view. For tragedy has complication (desis) and other events outside, e.g. Oedipus' murder of Laius, and these are continuous with what is inside the action of the play. On the other hand, Glanville's solution is to mediate by means of chance (tukhê) between surprise (thaumaston) and the structure of peripeteia. But this idea makes the structure of peripeteia obscure. For peripeteia is a part of muthos, and therefore must comply with the exigencies of the nexus of probabilities and necessities which constitute it. It is paradoxical yet logical change. After all, the question concerning doxa of the audience remains unsolved. This question is one of the eternal questions : how can we appreciate a piece of work performed or read repeatedly? We can see here the general character of the structure of peripeteia.
Certainly it is against the expectation of the audience that peripeteia is an "unexpected" change, but at such a peripeteia-scene the change is also against the expectation of the tragic hero, even more so than that of the audience. Accordingly, I examine the nuances of metabolê and metaballein as to the type of muthos, and the role of change (metabolê) in muthos.
By the phrase "eis dustukhian metaballein" (7.1451a14), Aristotle expresses the whole sequence of the events that constitute muthos, the fate of hero. In short, metaballein extends over the whole sequence of muthos and the "transformation" of the tragic hero. Therefore there can be only one metaballein in a muthos. On the other hand, peripeteia and anagnôrisis are each defined as metabolê (change) and these are defined as only a part of muthos. Hence metabolê cannot extend over the whole sequence. Furthermore in a muthos there can be several metabolê, e.g. in muthos of the Odyssey anagnôrisi is used throughout. But metaballein or "transformation" into misfortune depends upon the change towards the opposite pole. This direction of change, in my opinion, is based upon the "paradoxical yet logical" structure of peripeteia. The necessary consequence of hero's action reflecting his dovxa leads him to affliction, contrary to his expectation. By means of this structure of peripeteia as change, the hero's transformation into misfortune is achieved.
Using a Simile of the Purgative (SP) Sextus Empiricus accepted the charge that skeptic's claims involve him self-refutation. There are two objections which can be raised against this. First Sextus is incoherent. Secondly, he is insincere. The aim of this paper is to defend him from these objections by interpreting the passage contain-ing SP.
Sextus uses SP in two contexts. In the first place (PHl. 206), he utilizes it to explain skeptical expressions, e. g. "Not more. " To borrow a recent phrase, this type of self-refutation belongs to the category of an absolute one. Sextus is relieved of trouble by declaring that skeptical expressions are the reports of subjective affections, which involve no commitment to the truth of the external objects. Second (M8. 480, PH2. 188), when Sextus argues a proof against the existence of proof, he makes his way toward the acceptance of self-refutation. This type, called pragmatic self-refutaion, is interpreted as Sextus' acknowledgement of the incoherence in skepticism.
McPherran pays attention to the temporal gaps in SP and intends to locate the acceptance of self-refutation in the strategy of skepticism to lead from equivalance to suspending judgement. I agree with him in this point. However I do not share his view that a skeptic's statement is to be a persuasive. In that case, the strategy of skepticism would be restricted strikingly. On the contrary, irrespective of the experience of persuation, he can oppose a statement to every dogmatical statement, that is a belief, in order to establish the equivalence between them. For it is skeptical motivation to purge dogmatic's belief with his statement. From this viewpoint one may say that a skeptic's self-refutation is a voluntary one.
Glidden criticizes such an attitude as insincere. SP is nothing but a joke for him. But the skeptic's statement is not his own, in so far as it is an antithesis to that of the dogmatist. The fact that Sextus often uses the terms paristanai (to make to stand beside) and hupomimêskein (to bring back to one's mind) in such cases proves it. Moreover, the ambiguity of the skeptical method will be justified in respect of the skeptical end, i. e. unperturbedness. In this case, however, it may be that the skeptic appears to be incoherent again. For the method of the purge itself would be a belief. Sextus does not think so, because everything the skeptic does is only accidental. This accidentalness is sometimes interpreted as a weakness of skepticism. Yet to expect more than it is a belief which needs purgation. It is a belief of desirability of knowlegde, that the skeptic sights as a target.